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PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO CLOSE
THE 13(d) WINDOw
Congress adopted the Williams Act' in 1968 for the broad remedial
purpose of protecting shareholders in contests of corporate control.2
While a majority of the Act addresses stock acquisition by means of a
tender offer,' section 13(d) of the Act requires disclosure regardless of
the method of acquisition.4 Section 13(d) requires any person who ac-
quires more than five percent of a security registered under section 12 of
the Securities Act to disclose certain information within ten days of
achieving five percent ownership.' The dual purpose of section 13(d) is
to alert shareholders to any rapid accumulation of securities that may
signal a potential change in control and to provide them with the infor-
1. The Williams Act added tender offer provisions, sections 14(d),(e), and (f) to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f)(1986). Additionally, the Williams Act added sec-
tions 13(d) and (e) which govern acquisitions by methods other than the tender offer. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e) (1986).
2. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-35 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58 (1974). Investors are protected by the disclosure and antifraud provisions.
3. A tender offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy the shares of a
company at a premium, usually above the market price. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess.
2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2811 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1711].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1986).
5. Section 13(d)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(1986) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly acquiring the beneficial ownership
of any equity security... is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per
centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, by registered mail, send
to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement
containing such of the following information and such additional information, as the Com-
mission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors....
The required disclosure includes information identifying the acquirers, the source of financing, the
size of the acquirers' shareholdings, arrangements with other persons with respect to the securities,
the purpose of the acquisition, and any plans or proposals to make major changes in the company
being acquired. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A)-(E)(1986). Section 13(d) exempts from disclosure, inter
alia, de minimis purchases of 2 percent of all outstanding stock within 12 months and acquisitions
which the Commission exempts because the purchases do not influence control. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(6)(1986).
Section 13(d), as initially enacted in 1968, imposed disclosure requirements upon the acquisition
of 10 percent of an equity security. In 1970, the threshold level was lowered to five percent to
provide for a more meaningful level of disclosure. The reduction was a response to open market
purchases of eight or nine percent which permitted the acquirer to avoid the disclosure requirements
of 13(d). H.R. REP. No. 91, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5025, 5027. See generally Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendment, 26
Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971).
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mation necessary to evaluate the worth of their securities when a poten-
tial for change in control occurs.6
At first blush, Congress' rationale for enacting mandatory disclosure
provisions as well as for distinguishing between the requirements of sec-
tions 13(d) and 14(d) appears legitimate.7 This Development, however,
suggests that the assumptions upon which the disclosure provisions and
the aforementioned distinction are based are, in fact, faulty. Congress
should re-evaluate the purposes that the Williams Act serves after exam-
ining the practical effect that disclosure requirements and differentiations
between tender offer and non-tender offer transactions have on stock
purchases. This Development suggests that Congress should repeal the
Williams Act disclosure provisions in their entirety, as empirical evi-
dence suggests that shareholders do not benefit from or take advantage of
disclosure. Because, however, Congress likely will not take such drastic
measures this Development suggests that Congress should at least elimi-
nate the distinction between sections 13(d) and 14(d) by narrowing or
closing the 13(d) window in light of a dramatic change in the market for
corporate securities.
The Williams Act incorporates Congress' philosophy that mandatory
disclosure is beneficial to shareholders. Economic analysis indicates,
however, that shareholders seeking protection under the provisions of the
Williams Act do not in fact benefit from mandatory disclosure. Effi-
ciency dictates that Congress repeal the Williams Act disclosure
provisions.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that target shareholders gain finan-
cially from corporate takeovers as do bidding shareholders.8 Thus, take-
overs produce net positive gains to shareholders as a group. 9
6. See G.A.F. Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972); H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2818; Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corpo-
rate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 853, 865-66 (1971).
7. The Act, as originally adopted, was "not aimed at obstructing legitimate takeover bids."
113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). It was only intended to prevent a corpora-
tion from being "financially raped without management or shareholders having any knowledge of
the acquisitions." Id. at 857 (statement of Sen. Kuchel). The 1970 amendment was aimed only at
the prevention of eight and nine percent purchases as a means of avoiding the Act's requirements.
116 CONG. Rac. 5027 (1970). See supra note 5.
8. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control The Evidence, I 1 J. FIN. ECON.
5, 9-22 (1983) (On the average, target shareholders gain 29% and bidder shareholders gain 4%);
Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tenders Offers, 23
J. LAW & ECON. 371, 371-403 (1980).
9. See supra note 8.
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Additionally, a market for corporate control provides a check on ineffi-
cient management,"0 primarily through the efficient allocation of re-
sources."1  Corporate takeovers, therefore, provide benefits to society12 as
well as financial benefits to both bidding and target shareholders.
Takeover regulations operate to deter beneficial business combinations
in several ways. First, the imposition of securities regulations that gov-
ern takeovers through mandatory disclosure provisions decreases the
profitability of a takeover by artificially raising the price of shares. 3
Takeover regulations have the same economic effect as the imposition of
a tax on takeovers. 4 An increase in the price reduces the quantity of
takeovers attempted. Thus, takeover regulations impose a social cost in
the form of foregone valuable corporate combinations.' 5
Second, requiring advance disclosure of potential takeovers creates
two types of free rider problems16 by permitting information known to
the potential acquirer to become public knowledge. Information con-
cerning the precise source of gain from a corporate combination is the
would-be public good. 7 The potential acquirer only has incentive to
10. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
11. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549. But
see Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (markets are not as efficient as once thought).
12. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors,
70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984). But cf. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Controb A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1167-1173
(1984) (explaining the empire building and exploitation hypotheses as possible purposes for corpo-
rate takeovers).
13. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 8, at 28 (federal regulation increases premiums to target
shareholders by 20%); Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 8, at 372; Crock, SEC Seeks Takeover Rule
Changes to End Controversy, Could Increase Firms' Costs, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
14. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 8, at 373.
15. Id. But see Jensen & Ruback, supra note 8, at 29 (raising transactions costs simply trun-
cates the distribution of takeovers).
16. A free rider is someone who obtains a benefit for which another has paid. Free rider
problems often occur with respect to public goods. Public goods are products which can be used by
many parties without decreasing their value. For example, public television is a public good because
its value is not decreased by an additional person watching. Thus, a free rider is someone who, for
example, watches PBS without contributing to the cost of its broadcast. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra
note 8, at 372-73.
17. Id. Proponents of disclosure mandates agree that the information is like a public good in
nature. They assert that because of its public nature, mandatory disclosure is necessary to increase
the quality and amount of information available. Proponents further argue that the excessive search
for information in pursuit of trading gains creates a social waste. See Coffee, Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
Washington University Open Scholarship
436 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
search for information that would lead him to economic gain if he knows
the information will not be shared with others. Section 13(d) forces the
potential acquirer to purchase, theoretically, the remaining ninety-five
percent of a target corporation's stock. This diminishes the benefits that
would accrue to the potential acquirer who obtained information. Be-
cause section 13(d) destroys incentives to search for information, less in-
formation that would lead to valuable corporate combinations and a
more efficient allocation of resources will be discovered.
Moreover, to the extent that disclosure decreases the probability that
an aquirer will wage a successful takeover by attracting bidders who use
the acquirer's information, fewer initial bids will be made. Thus,
although disclosure requirements may facilitate auctioning, their useful-
ness is negated by their chilling effect upon bids.' 8
Third, disclosure requirements may be economically wasteful. Empiri-
cal evidence indicates that security prices reflect information already
contained in SEC filings prior to the disclosure's filing date under section
13(d). 19
Finally, evidence indicates that regulations increase the returns to tar-
get shareholders at the expense of bidding shareholders.2" Congress
designed the Act to shift the gain to target shareholders by affording
them protection not found on the market. This regulatory shift, how-
ever, harms shareholders, who as a group typically hold diversified port-
folios. Because shareholders do not know in advance whether the shares
they hold are target or bidder shares, they should prefer a rule that maxi-
mizes the number of takeovers because they receive a higher price for
their shares. Ex ante shareholders benefit the most from a rule that max-
imizes the incentive to bid on shares and take over corporations. 2' Thus,
mandatory disclosure harms shareholders despite the Williams Act's at-
tempt to protect them.
One could argue that the pressure of increases in the returns which
target shareholders receive indicates that disclosure requirements prevent
shareholder prisoners' dilemma 22 by providing shareholders with time
18. See Banoff, The Securities Commission's Takeover Proposals: A "Law and Economics"Per-
spective, 2 CANTERBURY L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1985).
19. Gilson & Kraakrran, supra note 11, at 638. But disclosure requirements do reduce the cost
of acquiring the information and, thus, benefit informed traders. Id.
20. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 8, at 29.
21. See Banoff, supra note 18, at 300-01; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
22. Prisoners' dilemma refers to a situation where two parties, who are unable to collectivize
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during which they may collectivize their actions.2 3 The increased activ-
ity of intermediaries in the market,24 however, results in arbitrageurs, for
example, buying the stock of target corporations and, thereafter, tender-
ing the shares to bidders.25 The large concentrations of stock in the
hands of arbitrageurs (and institutional investors) gives them the bar-
gaining power that prevents a prisoners' dilemma.26 One of the arbi-
trageur's primary roles in the market is to shoulder the risk that a tender
offer will be unsuccessful.27 The competition between arbitrageurs pro-
vides a mechanism that transfers a large portion of the economic gains to
target shareholders.28 Although shareholders' financial interests often
conflict with the financial interests of intermediaries, the two interests do
not diverge to the same extent that shareholders' interests diverge from
an entrenched management's interests. Thus, although the prisoners' di-
lemma may have provided a rationale for disclosure requirements in
1968, the new market of intermediaries nullifies that concern.
The Williams Act disclosure requirements as they now exist are ineffi-
cient. Simply narrowing the 13(d) window would only compound the
their action, would both be better off if they could act jointly. The term is derived from a hypotheti-
cal situation involving two criminal co-conspirators. A prosecutor places the two prisoners in sepa-
rate rooms where they are unable to communicate. The prosecutor cannot prove the crime without
a confession from one of the offenders. The prosecutor offers each prisoner the following deal: if
you confess, you will only get two years, but if you do not confess and your partner does, you will get
ten years. Unable to collude, each prisoner confesses and they serve a total of four years. Had the
prisoners been able to act jointly, however, neither would have confessed and both would have been
set free. Graphically, this dilemma may be characterized as follows:
A,B A confesses I A does not confess I
B confesses 2,2 I 10,2 I
I B does not confess 2, 10 I 0,0 I
Shareholders are faced with prisoners' dilemmas when they must choose between selling at a price
which they consider inadequate or remaining a minority shareholder and being squeezed out. If the
shareholders act jointly they can command a higher price and, therefore, avoid the prisoners'
dilemma.
23. Shareholders can avoid the prisoners' dilemma by adopting defensive measures such as
supermajority provisions.
24. See infra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of this change in the market.
25. See Securities and Exchange Commission Response to Congressman Wirth's Letter of Jan-
uary 25, 1985 Concerning Tender Offers, reprinted in 1985 Hearings, infra note 34, at 453-54.
26. "Institutions often have the resources and market expertise to develop sophisticated invest-
ment strategies. These attributes place institutional investors in a position, if they so desire .... to
prevent steps they believe would adversely affect the company." Id. at 451.
27. Id. at 454-55. Additionally, the arbitrageur provides liquidity and assumes the risk of pro-
ration. Id.
28. Id.
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existing inefficiencies. Requiring disclosure before a takeover offer in-
creases the cost of takeover because the bidder must fend off other suitors
and battle with incumbent management for a longer time period. Early
disclosure also decreases the incentive for potential acquirers to seek in-
formation because the finder must share the information prematurely.
This, in turn, results in fewer takeover attempts. Thus, inefficient man-
agement will be further protected from takeover attempts which results
in an efficient allocation of capital.
Because Congress will not, in all likblihood, repeal the disclosure pro-
visions in the Williams Act, Congress should at a minimum delineate the
distinction drawn between section 13(d) and section 14(a) transactions.
The distinction between the regulation of tender offers and other meth-
ods of acquisition represented a deliberate and careful Congressional de-
cision.29 Section 13(d), as originally introduced in Congress, provided
for pretransaction disclosure similar to that required by 14(d) for tender
offers for all methods of acquisition.30 Later, in response to suggestions
made by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress modified
section 13(d) of the bill to apply only to tender offers.3 The current Act
incorporates this modification and requires pretransaction disclosure
only for section 14(d) tender offers.32 Congress reasoned that "disclosure
after the transaction avoids upsetting the free and open auction negotia-
tions between market where buyer and seller normally do not disclose the
extent of their interest and avoids prematurely disclosing the terms of
privately negotiated transactions. '33
Since 1980, Congress and the SEC have considered various proposals
that would narrow the 13(d) ten-day "window" period between five per-
cent acquisition and the 13(d) filing requirements. 34 Narrowing the win-
29. See Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game: The Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 409, 427
(1980).
30. 112 CONG. REC. 19,003-06 (1966).
31. Id.
32. 113 CONG. REc. 854, 856 (1967). Section 14(d) requires disclosure by any person launch-
ing a tender offer which, if consummated, would raise her ownership above the 5% threshold. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1986).
33. 113 CONG. REc. 854, 856 (1967).
34. See 542 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. (Feb. 27, 1980) (SEC asked Congress to enact proposals
that would require 5 percent purchasers to disclose the purchase within one day and to prohibit any
further purchases by the person or company until filing requirements were met); H.R. 2669, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (filing by noon of next business day); Takeover Tactics and Public Policy:
Hearings on H. 2371, HR. 5250, H.R. 5693, H.R. 5694, HR. 5696, H.R. 5697 Before the Sub.
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dow would bring more non-tender offer transactions under the
requirements of the Williams Act. The proposed legislation would sub-
ject previously unregulated, non-tender offer transactions, made within
ten days of the initial five percent acquisition, to section 13(d) disclosure
requirements. Furthermore, narrowing the 13(d) window would erode
the distinction that the drafters established between pre-acquisition and
post-acquisition disclosure.35 The increasing role of market in-
termediaries, such as institutional investors and arbitrageurs, and the
large concentration of shares that they hold may negate the purposes for
which the 13(d)/14(d) distinction was created.36
Congress intended section 13(d) to alert shareholders to any potential
change in control, which would be evidenced by a rapid accumulation of
stock via the open market and privately negotiated purchases. Share-
holders are put on notice so that they can reevaluate their stock with the
knowledge that it may be the subject of a contest for corporate control.37
At present, section 13(d) does not provide offerees in non-tender offer
transactions with advance notice to permit shareholders to counter the
pressure that accompanies the rapid acquisition of stock. Apparently,
Congress assumed that a suitor would not acquire control during the ten-
day window period. Notice of the potential for a change in control, if
received after the occurrence of the change, is valueless.
By comparison, Congress intended section 14(d) to provide sharehold-
ers whose stock is the subject of an attempt to gain control by tender
offer with sufficient knowledge to make an informed decision as to
whether to sell.38 To provide this knowledge, Congress requires that
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1984) (immediate public announcement and next day
filing); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of
the House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 418-23 (1985) [hereinafter 1985
Hearings] (filing within two days; Ingersoll, SEC Seeks to Speed Investor Disclosure of Big Purchases
of a Company's Stock, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 32, col. 1 (public announcement within two
days).
35. Combined with requirements that any acquisition of greater than 15 percent of a corpora-
tion's outstanding shares can be made only by statutory tender offer, the distinction is virtually
eliminated.
36. A 1984 study found that institutional investors, subject to the section 13(f) reporting re-
quirements, owned over 60 percent of the outstanding share of a large number of Fortune 500 com-
panies. See COMPUTER DIRECTIONS ADVISORS, INC. SPECTRUM 4: 13(f) INSTITUTIONAL
INVESToRS xvi (Dec. 31, 1984).
37. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58 (1974).
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suitors disclose their intent to purchase prior to making a tender offer. 39
Furthermore, Congress intended to protect shareholders from the pres-
sure of coercive tender offers by requiring offerors to provide sharehold-
ers with advance notice of a possible tender offer, proration, and
minimum time period protections.4' Congress believed that non-tender
offer purchases would not create the same shareholder pressures as
tender offer acquisitions. Hence, Congress did not provide these addi-
tional protections in non-tender offer transactions.
Thus, the 13(d)/14(d) disclosure distinctions are based upon the as-
sumptions that a suitor would not obtain control during the ten-day win-
dow period and that target shareholders in non-tender offer transactions
would not be subject to the same pressures as tender offerees. These un-
derlying protections fail because control can be acquired via the open
market and privately negotiated transactions in less than ten days. When
this occurs, a shareholder will be faced with the decision of whether to
sell shares or retain them and become a minority shareholder, the same
decision pressure to which tender offerees are subjected without sufficient
information on which to base such a decision.41
The concentration of shares in the hands of institutional investors and
arbitrageurs enables an acquirer to purchase control on the open market
in a very brief period of time. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, in the face of a
hostile tender offer, repurchased eighteen percent of its outstanding
shares in a two hour period, and over fifty percent in seven trading
days.4 2 Likewise, Hanson Trust PLC acquired twenty-five percent of
SCM Corporation's outstanding stock through five privately-negotiated
cash purchases and one open market purchase within a two hour pe-
riod.43 These sellers were primarily institutional investors, arbitrageurs
and other market professionals."
To the extent that an acquirer can achieve control during the ten-day
window period, section 13(d) offerees are not protected from the pres-
sures that the Williams Act sought to alleviate. Thus, one could argue
that Congress should narrow the window, or, given the very brief period
in which an acquirer can obtain control, close it completely by requiring
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1986).
40. Id.
41. See S.E.C. v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
42. Id.
43. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 52-53.
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preacquisition notice for large-scale purchases, regardless of the manner
in which the transactions are made.45
Closing the window may be inconsistent with the drafters' interests
which included protecting the free and open auction market.46 Argua-
bly, however, the drafters intended to protect the market for investment
shares, not control shares. Empirical studies demonstrate that control
shares and investment shares are different goods in that control shares
command a higher price than investment shares.4 7 Closing the 13(d)
window would primarily affect the control share market which, in turn,
would prevent a suitor from obtaining control without disclosing his in-
tentions after achieving five percent ownership. Certainly, a suitor would
prefer to avoid this disclosure requirement because the price he must pay
for control would increase. Investors could, however, purchase up to five
percent of a corporation's shares without having to disclose and, after
disclosing that the acquisition was for investment purposes only, could
continue to purchase additional shares. Closing the window would only
affect investors by requiring them to disclose before they purchase over
five percent of the outstanding shares.
Closing the window might also tip the balance of regulation in favor of
management by providing the board of directors with earlier notice and,
thus, more time to defend against a tender offer.48 Such tipping is not
clearly contrary to the drafters' intent. While the 1968 legislative history
reflects Congress' intent that all parties to the tender offer be put on an
"equal footing", the history also expressly recognizes that the Act will
deter some takeover bids.49 Indeed, commentators criticized the legisla-
tion for protecting management: ° "Perhaps the committee's silence [in
response to the criticism] ... reflects some philosophical overtones here
whose disquieting effect cannot be entirely removed." 5
Finally, the movement of the market away from investment shares to-
45. The statutory tender offer proposals, in effect, close the window almost completely.
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Evidence, II J. FiN. ECON.
5, 9-22 (1983).
48. The legislative history of the Williams Act reflects a concern that the regulations balance
the interests of management, the bidder, and the target shareholders. See 113 CONG. REc. 854
(1967); Piper, 430 U.S. at 31.
49. 113 CONG. REc. 854, 855 (1967).
50. See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RtrrGERs L. REv. 609 (1967);
Mundheim, Why the Bill on Tender Offers Should Not be Passed, I INST. INVEST. 24 (May, 1967).
51. L. Loss, 6 SECUarrF.s REGULATION 3665 (1969).
1988]
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wards control shares results in a playing field that favors acquirers. As
the Act currently stands, suitors are able to obtain control in ways not
contemplated by Congress in 1968. Hence, narrowing the window would
merely even the playing field between buyers and shareholders.
Thus, an examination of the current structure of the investor market
provides a strong argument for narrowing or closing the 13(d) window.
The high concentration of shares in the hands of intermediaries permits
acquirers to obtain control of a corporation in a very short time. This
exposes 13(d) offerees to the same pressures that 14(d) offerees face.52 By
shortening or completely eliminating the time period between when an
acquirer first purchases shares and when he must disclose his intentions,
offerees could retain the benefits of section 13(d) protections. The argu-
ments mustered against closing the window depend on ambiguous legis-
lative intent and are, therefore, suspect.53 Congress would best preserve
the original purposes of the Act by narrowing or closing the 13(d)
window.
The active role of market intermediaries affects the inquiries that Con-
gress should make when evaluating the effectiveness of mandatory disclo-
sure under section 13(d). The presence of intermediaries blurs the
distinction between 13(d) and 14(d) transactions. Thus, Congress should
arguably close the 13(d) window to afford both 13(d) and 14(d) offerees
the protections of the Act. A reassessment of the underlying reason for
affording shareholders any protection, however, suggests that Congress
should eliminate the disclosure requirements altogether. Economic anal-
ysis indicates that disclosure requirements send biased signals to the mar-
ket and result in an inefficient allocation of resources. Furthermore,
disclosure requirements harm shareholders as a group and, ironically,
fail to protect the very group the statute was designed to protect. Fi-
nally, the strongest argument for retaining disclosure requirements, the
prevention of prisoners' dilemma, is vitiated by the presence of market
intermediaries through whom shareholder interests are collectivized.
Kimberly A. Lynch
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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